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ABSTRACT 
Sperber and Wilson (1995) ground their defínition of communication on their criticism of 
Grice's intentional defínition of non-natural meaning. In such a perspective, communication 
is considered as an act rather than as a process. Sperber and Wilson propose two definitions 
of this fundamental concept. In a first time, they argüe that communication involves two 
specific intentions; afterwards, they equate it with ostensión. This paper examines and 
criticizes their proposals, confronting them to ordinary intuition. Some crucial issues are 
discussed: the equivalence of Sperber and Wilson's two definitions, the nature of the evidence 
used in communication, the intentionality of communication, the content of the communicative 
intention, the notion of mutual mamfestness, and the problem of infinite regress. 
The analysis of communication is a central component of Relevance Theory. Sperber 
and Wilson's book (1986/1995) mentions communication in its subtitle and largely focuses 
on this topic.* Indeed, Sperber and Wilsorf ground their own theory on a radical criticism 
of Grice's intentional conception of communication (see W&S, 1979; S&W, 1986/1995). 
In this paper, I would luce to examine S&W's views on communication in order to assess 
their internal coherence and to confront them to speakers' intuitions. 
I will begin by distinguishing between two possible ways of considering communication, 
viz. as a process or as an act (which should not be confused with any speech act). I will try 
to characterize S&W's approach to these two dimensions of speech activity. I will then 
discuss the two definitions of communication they propose and evalúate them empirically. 
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My discussion will concern, among other things, the nature of the evidence used in 
communication, the intentions required, and the notion of mutoal manifestness. 
1. Communication : act or process ? 
Although they severely criticize Grice's attempts to account for communication as well as 
for interpretation processes, S&W consider that Grice's definition of non-natural meaning 
can be elaborated on in order to develop an inferential model of communication (see S&W, 
1995: 21). 
Letus recall that, according to Grice, a communicator C non-naturally means (and thus 
communicates) something to an audience A by a stimulus x iff C has the following 
intentions: 
(1) that x produces a response r to A, 
(2) that A recognizes (1) and 
(3) that A's recognition of (1) at least partly motivates A's response r. 
S&W's criticism bears on two main points : the content of intentions (l)-(3) and the 
principie of cooperation, which, according to Grice, governs utterance production and 
interpretation. S&W eventually propose to define communication by means of two 
intentions only, and to replace the principie of cooperation and the maxims derived from it 
by a single principie of relevance. Here I limit my discussion to the first issue, although the 
second one would also deserve some critical examination. 
When examining Grice's definition, we notice that it mainly focuses on the 
communicator, who may be held responsible for an act of meaning or communication. In 
fact, C communicates if he produces a stimulus with the required intentions. So A's 
interpretation of C's act should not influence our quaüfication of it. In such a perspective, 
communication may be viewed as a particular kind of action, provided we admit that acting 
consiste in intentionally modifying the environment.3 In my opinión, Relevance Theory 
adopts a similar approach:"... an act of communication (in an appropriately restricted sense 
of the term) might be characterised as one that fulfils these Gricean intentions" (1995: 28). 
On the other hand, several alternative approaches reduce communication to a process which 
involves interaction. Those interactional models often rely on notions such as cooperation 
(see e.g. Allwood, 1976) or socialization (see e.g. Meijers, 1994) - assuming, then, some 
form of collective intentionality. Even if they informally define communication as a 
"process" (1995: 1), S&W would probably reject such interactional models. Indeed, their 
purely individualistic framework cannot deal with the social dimensions of pragmatics. 
Moreover, in their technical definitions, they rather consider communication as an act. 
Obviously, our daily concept of communication allows for both interpretations. But 
even if we adopt an interactional approach, we should concede that every communication 
process involves some actions such as, at least, C's production of a stimulus, A's 
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interpretation of it, or A's reaction. Furthermore, the success of an act of communication 
does not depend on its recognition by the audience A. This condition only bears on the 
satisfaction of the act, which requires some "action" of A's.4 Thus, I feel entitled to limit my 
investigation to C's act of producing an utterance addressed to A, even though I must 
confess that considering such an act as part of a process may have further consequences for 
its characterization, and that my restrictive approach prevenís me from giving a thorough 
account of communication. 
In fect, communication is the only topic with respect to which Relevance Theory takes 
action into account. Indeed, according to S&W, utterances convey thoughts and not 
actions,5 in particular, they claim that pragmatics need not intégrate any theory of "speech 
acts". 1 won't discuss this issue any further here.6 Let me just recall that speech acts are not 
to be confused with the act of communication, despite the intricate relationships which hold 
between both categories. 
2. S&W's conception of communication 
Before examining S&W's own definition(s) of an act of communication, I would like to 
make two preliminary remarks. First, S&W, like Grice, do not restrict their theory to verbal 
communication: language is only one of the means that one can rely on in order to 
communicate. Secondly, the thesis that "communication involves the publication and the 
recognition of intentions" (1995: 24) is a truism for S&W, who assume that "from the 
psychological point of view, intentions are mental representations capable of being realised 
in the form of actions" (1995: 31). 
According to Grice, C communicates only if he has intentions (l)-(3). However, 
communication involves something more than the simple fect of having some intentions: the 
communicator must produce a stimulus which makes his intentions manifest, i.e. he must 
make them accessible to the audience. In Grice's framework, the publicity of intentions is 
ensured both by positing intention (2), which requires that A should recognize intention (1), 
and by assuming that communicators are rational. Personally, I prefer to use, as do S&W, 
a specific concept of manifestness. Since I will have to come back to this issue later, I quote 
here S&W's defínition of manifestness, as well as some related definitions that will prove 
relevant to the following discussion: 
"A tact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at 
that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or 
probably true. (...) To be manifest, then, is to be perceptible or inferable." 
(1995: 39). 
"A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to 
him." (idem) 
"Any shared cognitive environment in which it is manifest which people share 
it is what we cali a mutual cognitive environment. In a mutual cognitive 
environment, for every manifest assumption, the fact that it is manifest to the 
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people who share this environment is itself manifest. In other words, in a mutual 
manifest environment, every manifest assumption is what we cali mutually 
manifest" (1995: 41-42). 
As I have already pointed out, S&W criticize Grice's definition of communication on 
several points. But, in fact, in later papers, after taking in consideration some critical 
remarks and counter-examples, Grice himself modified his original definition. His critics 
had put into question the necessity of considering a perlocutionary intention (the first 
intention),7 the content of the third intention and the correlative requirement of indirect 
evidence,8 and the overtness of the communicative intention (in relation with the second 
intention).9 Grice (1989: 95-96) accepted, for instance, Strawson's objections aboutthe 
second intention, viz. that his definition allows for some cases of deceit to be considered as 
communication, contrary to our intuitions. In order to ensure the overtness of 
communication, he proposed the following solution (1989: 95-100): since one is forced to 
introduce either a reflexive intention or an infinite regress in the intentions themselves, one 
should consider this reflexivity or infinite regress as an idealization, and consequently add 
to the three basic intentions the ceteris paribus clause that no deceitful intention operates at 
this juncture. S&W reject the hypothesis of the infinite regress as being psychologically 
unplausible. According to them, it is unlikely that humans would even aim at such 
unachievable purposes. I will tackle this problem later in my discussion, while examining 
S&W's putative way out, which rests on the notion of mutual manifestness. Roughly 
speaking, one could say that, in order to define communication, S&W modify intentions (1) 
and (2) drastically, and thatthey replace intention (3) by the requirement that C should give 
indirect evidence of his information. In fact, they formúlate two definitions of 
communication. The first one relies on a description of the informative and communicative 
intentions at work; in the second one, communication is accounted for in terms of ostensión. 
2.1. S&W's first definition of communication 
S&W wantto distinguish communication from the simple transfer of information. If C only 
gives direct evidence for the information he wishes to convey, he does not communicate; 
to do so, he must provide A with indirect evidence for the information he wants to convey, 
and so with direct evidence of his intention to convey it, so that A can infer what C's 
intentions are. For instance, C cannot communicate that he has a sore throat by simply 
letting hear his hoarse voice (see S&W 1995: 22): "We have shown two different ways of 
conveying information. One way is to provide direct evidence for the information to be 
conveyed. This should not be regarded as a form of communication : any state of affairs 
provides direct evidence for a variety of assumptions without necessarily communicating 
those assumptions in any interesting sense. (...) Another way of conveying information is 
to provide direct evidence of one's intention to convey it. (...) This second method is clearly 
a form of communication" (1995: 23). Whether C, to communicate, relies or not on a code 
does not matter: "... coded communication is only used as a means of strengthening 
ostensive-inferential communication" (1995: 63). Unfortunately, S&W do notspecify the 
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ways C can use to make his intentions manifest, ñor do they formúlate any criterion which 
could distinguish neatly between both types of evidence. 
Now, what are the intentions at work ? There are two - an informative intention and a 
communicative intention: "A communicator produces a stimulus intending thereby 
(informative intention) to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of 
assumptions {I}" (1995: 58), "and intending moreover (communicative intention) to make 
it mutually manifest to audience and communicator that the communicator has this 
informative intention" (1995: 61). S&W also claim that "successful communication"10 only 
requires that the communicative intention be fulfilled. However, consider what they say in 
their final definition of ostensive-inferential communication : "the communicator produces 
a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the 
communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the 
audience a set of assumptions {I}" (1995: 63). There is a least one reading of this definition 
which entails that the existence of a communicative intention is not a necessary condition 
for communication to take place. This accounts for the fact that S&W eventually claim that 
communication may be unintentional. I will question this claim later, when analyzing 
S&W's alleged example of unintentional communication. Until then, I will consider that, 
for S&W, C communicates iff his communicative intention is fulfilled, that is iff the 
informative intention is made mutually manifest. 
2.2. S&W's second definition of communication 
S&W also try to reduce communication to ostensión: "Can the term 'communication' be 
legitimately applied to all cases of ostensión? Our answer is yes. (...) Inferential 
communication and ostensión are one and the same process, but seen from two different 
points of view" (1995: 54). Ostensión is a special kind of behaviour "which makes manifest 
an intention to make something manifest" (1995: 49) and its existence is beyond any doubt 
for S&W. The intention involved obviously corresponds to the informative intention. 
However, it is less obvious that ostensión also involves any communicative intention or 
simply any similar constraint. In fact, S&W never establish the equivalence of both 
definitions, they only state it, illustrating their point of view with examples. They hold that 
the equation of communication with ostensión follows from their rejection of the idea that 
communication "consists in providing evidence for what the communicator means" (1995: 
54). According to them, such a characterization could not capture any clearcut class of 
phenomena. This point will be examined in detail in the next section. 
3. Indirect evidence 
S&W's definitions of communication do not intégrate any intentional requirement that could 
correspond to Grice's third intention. They rather stipulate that C has to give indirect 
evidence for the information he intends to convey, which means giving direct evidence of 
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his intention to convey it. In foct, as noticed by Schiffer (1972: 56), Grice's third intention 
too encompasses such a constraint. S&W justify their claim by pointing out that, while any 
state of aftairs can make sorae assumptions manifest, nobody would say that "it 
communicates". However, such a process cannot be intentional either, so that nobody would 
ever confuse the two phenomena. In fact, whereas Grice wanted to eliminate any remnant 
of natural meaning from his analysis of communication in terms of non-natural meaning, 
S&W think that there is no clear distinction between both varieties of meaning. They prefer 
to assume that the different cases of ostensión rank on a continuum, which ranges from 
instances of showing to acts of saying. This seems to contradict their wish to distinguish 
clearly between transferring information and communicating. Personally, I think that the 
Gricean requirement of indirect evidence is unnecessary and even incorrect. In my opinión, 
C can communicate by giving direct evidence for his information as soon as he also displays 
evidence of his intention to communicate. This will happen, for instance, when it is clear 
enough that direct evidence is intentionally provided. I suppose that S&W could agree with 
me on this point. 
To make his intentions manifest, C has to rely on natural or conventional meaning. This 
requirement is never mentioned by Grice or S&W, but it seems unavoidable to me. As 
pointed out by Schiffer (1972: 13), there must be some link between what C means and what 
he uses to mean it. For me, this link may be of two kinds: natural or conventional. Notice, 
however, that the limit between both types may be fuzzy: for instance, linguistic meaning, 
which is often regarded as - and certainly is, at the very beginning - conventional, may also 
be considered as natural once the convention is so strongly established that everyone has 
forgotten it.11 On the other hand, one can always créate a new code and use it to 
communicate, grounding one's meaning on this convention. Anyway, it cannot be 
maintained that any stimulus is able to convey any message. I may communicate to you that 
I have broken my finger by showing you my splint with the required intention (relying, 
then, on natural meaning), or by telling you "I have broken my finger" (relying, then, on 
linguistic meaning), but it would be difficult to get the same result by shaking my head, for 
instance. We have just seen that, for Grice (and sometimes for S&W), there is no 
communication in the fírst case. However, even in verbal interaction, it is not always easy 
to determine whether a given stimulus provides evidence for some information or evidence 
of C's intention to convey it. Consequently, even if there existe, in verbal interaction, a 
presumption that something is communicated, we still have to determine what really is 
communicated. For instance, one may wonder on which criteria S&W ground their claim 
that showing a tube of aspirin is indirect evidence of headache and speaking with a hoarse 
voice direct evidence of a sore throat. I would prefer to consider (in)directness as a gradable 
property, and accept any of these cases as an example of communication - all the more so 
since S&W, finally, seem to share this view. 
Livet (1994: 46) argües that, in the case of Herod showing St John the Baptist's head 
to Salome, Salome does not need to attribute a communicative intention to Herod in order 
to understand that St John is dead, since his head on a trail is natural evidence of his death. 
That is right, but she can still infer that Herod wants to communicate, because nofhing 
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prevente him from doing so, neither her from interpreting the situation as such. According 
to Livet, however, to forcé A to attribute to C a communicative intention, C must use non-
natural evidence for the information he wishes to convey. It seems to me that, even so, the 
act of showing the head may be sufficient to assume that Herod has a communicative 
intention, though other interpretations remain possible, depending on the analysis one 
makes of the situation. On this issue, I follow Schiffer (1972: 20-21) and Récanati (1986), 
who both consider that when Herod shows St John's head to Salome in order to inform her 
of his death, he can undoubtedly communicate. Moreover, Schiffer (1972: 56-57) sees no 
difference between showing a bandaged leg in reaction of an invitation to play, squash 
(which would be indirect evidence for a refusal) and showing it in order to answer to "I 
heard that your leg was bandaged. Is that trae?" (which would be direct evidence). Neither 
do I. 
To come back to S&W, I must add that, for me, ostensión effectively seems to involve 
some use of indirect evidence, since it makes manifest some intention to make something 
manifest. But nothing ensures that it does not also give direct evidence for this information. 
In such a perspective, Herod's behaviour is a good example of ostensión. S&W themselves 
write that "sometimes all the evidence displayed in an act of ostensión bears directly on the 
agent's intentions" (1995: 52), which entails that the same does not hold for some other 
cases. In conclusión, I think it unnecessary to impose a restriction on the kind of evidence 
C should use in order to communicate. It is a natural consequence of the intentional 
definition of communication that C shows some evidence of his intentions. As soon as there 
is some evidence of a communicative intention, one may be considered as communicating, 
whether or not one gives also direct evidence for the conveyed information. 
4. Unintentional communication 
In all (post-)Gricean approaches, communication is a matter of intentions, even if every 
singular definition imposes restrictions of its own on the form or content of intentions. In 
the following, I wül determine which intentions a communicator must have, and which ones 
he must make manifest; this will allow me to better capture the differences between both 
requirements. 
Since I view communication as a particular kind of action, I hold that it is always 
intentional and involves particular kinds of intentions. Although they agree that 
communication is basically intentional, S&W claim that, according to their definition, it 
may sometimes tum out to be unintentional. As the example they give in their book (1995: 
63-64) may seem unconvincing, I will discuss here a slightly different case (Sperber, 
personal communication). Imagine that a vase has broken and C wants A to know about it 
withouthaving A know about his informative intention. Thus C has an informative intention 
but he has no intention to communicate; that is, C has no intention to produce a stimulus that 
makes mutually manifest to A and C that C has this informative intention. In order to inform 
A, C puts the pieces of the vase in a place where A cannot fail to notice them. 
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Unfortunately, A sees what C is doing, and C also sees (in a mirror, for instance) that A is 
looking at him and that A sees that C is aware of this. In consequence, C's informative 
intention becoraes mutually raanifest to A and C, so that unintentional communication takes 
place. 
Up to now, I have assumed that S&W consider communication as a kind of behaviour 
(ostensión is defined this way), and so as a kind of action. I have also supposed that they 
define communication by the conjunction of two intentions that C should have in producing 
his stimulus (see 1995: 58 & 61). However, in this last example, C obviously has no 
communicative intention; on the contrary, he has the opposite intention not to make his 
informative intention manifest to A. What happens here is that his attempt fails: while 
producing his stimulus, he involuntarily makes manifest his informative intention. In my 
view, this does not entail that C communicates, even if the whole story proves compatible 
with one of S&W's definition (see 1995: 63; quoted above), which contradicts another one 
(1995: 61; also quoted above). The former definition does not characterize the production 
of the stimulus as precisely as the latter one: indeed, this production may be intentional and 
still not involve a communicative intention. In such a case, the intention at work does not 
characterize any particular kind of action; what we have is just an action whose particular 
consequences may even be independent of C's intentions. S&W's claim would be justiñed 
if they reduced communication to a simple result, analyzing thus the whole situation instead 
of people's actions and intentions. Such a view would confuse the communicative process -
or at least the communicative result of some action - with the act of communication itself. 
But if we focus on this very act, we should not require any intervention of A's in order to 
assess which cases are instances of communication. It seems to me that, in the example 
under discussion, C does not communicate and that, furthermore, A will not consider C as 
a communicating agent: by noticing, for instance, that C was annoyed when seeing A, A 
will probably understand that C did not want to make his intention manifest. So A will 
attxibute to C an intention to dissimulate his informative intention rather than an intention 
to make it mutually manifest (see also Livet 1994: 57). And even though A interpreted C 's 
action as an act of communication, this alone would not entail that C was really 
communicating. In my opinión, no interpretation can, by itself, créate any reality, except 
perhaps in a normative framework, where C would be held responsible of what his 
behaviour manifests. But S&W clearly have no intention to introduce such a normative 
flavour in their model. To sum up, it seems advisable to stick to the idea that communication 
is intentional, which means that C communicates if he produces some stimulus with some 
communicative intention linked to this production. 
5. Having, manifesting or recognizing intentions 
As shown in section 2, the Gricean definition of non-natural meaning mentions the 
production of a stimulus with a set of specific intentions, which C is supposed to have. This 
set includes, among others, an intention to have some intention recognized. On the other 
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hand, S&W often talk of making intentions manifest. What are the differences and the 
relationships between manifesting, having, and recognizing an intention ? 
Obviously, you can have an intention which is not manifest to anybody else, so that it 
remains completely private. But communication involves public intentions, i.e. intentions 
that are made manifest to other people. They can be manifest either because someone has 
made them manifest intentionally, or simply because of the situation. Conversely, one can 
make an intention manifest without having it. But if C makes one of his intentions mutually 
manifest to A and C, he must have this intention. If he did not have the intention he 
pretended to have, he could not make this intention mutually manifest to A and to himself, 
since he would know that he hasn't this intention, which then could not be manifest to 
himself. Indeed, for any individual, manifestness entails truth or the probability of truth. 
Let me ¿Ilústrate (hese distinctions with the help of an example. By announcing his 
forthcoming departure, C may intentionally make manifest an intention to leave, which he 
may have or not, and, by doing so, he may provide evidence for an intention of his not to 
come back ever again-, without wanting this intention to be manifest. In communication, 
what matters is making intentions manifest, and even making them manifest intentionally, 
since communication is a kind of action. In my example, C will be considered as 
communicating his departure, but not as communicating his desire to stay away for ever. 
In my view, whether C really has or not the informative intention he makes manifest, has 
no incidence on communication as long as his insincerity remains hidden. Practically, 
however, communicators are considered as having the intentions they make manifest, 
otherwise communication would become impossible. In S&W's intentional framework, the 
situation is totally different: C must have the informative intention in order to make it 
mutually manifest, and he must have the communicative intention, if we want to maintain 
the intentionality of communication. In consequence, lying, for instance, is no 
communication at all. 
An intention to make something manifest is weaker than an intention to make it 
recognized, since manifest only means "recognizable". For me, in communicating, C has 
the intention that his intentions shall be recognized by A; but the only thing he can aim at 
is making his intentions manifest to A (or, at least, as manifest as possible), with the hope 
that A will effectively form the corresponding representations. For example, when you 
order someone to cióse the door, you intend him to recognize your intention, you do not just 
intend him to be able to recognize it. Unfortunately, in practice, you can only make your 
intention manifest to him, without ensuring its recognition. In fact, we may consider that 
C has managed to communicate if he has made his intentions manifest to A; but the content 
of his intentions involves A's recognition of them, so that C's act of communication is 
satisfied only when A recognizes those intentions of C's. This is an intuitive analysis of 
mine, which posits intentions that slightly differ from Grice's or S&W's ones, even though 
they resemble them. 
My intuitive requirement as a whole also differs from S&W's one. According to them, 
communication is "successful" as soon as the communicative intention is fulfilled, i.e. as 
soon as the informative intention is mutually manifest to A and C. In this situation, the 
68 Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
contení of the informative intention, as well as a set of assumptions {I}, must be manifest 
to A too; consequently, the informative intention is also fulfilled. Yet S&W argüe thatthe 
informative intention is not necessarily fulfilled, and that such a result depends on A, who 
can always refrain from accepting {1} as a set of true assumptions, thereby provoking the 
failure of the act of communication. Since this thesis could easily come against the well-
known objection of "the perlocutionary effect", S&W describe the content of the informative 
intention as a modification of A 's cognitive environment and not as some response of A's. 
But, if we are to believe our intuition, the acceptance of assumptions as true has nothing to 
do with puré communication; it rather concerns some speech act (e.g. an assertion or an 
attempt to convince). For instance, if someone understands your utterance without believing 
you, you will consider that your communication is "successful" though your illocutionary 
or perlocutionary intention is not fulfilled. 
The fact that manifestness is a very weak requirement will also créate problems when 
we turn to account for communication in an interactional perspective. Indeed, for an 
informative intention to be manifest to A, A does not need to recognize it, ñor does he need 
to build up an effective representation of the conveyed set of assumptions {1}. One may 
wonder how, on such modest premises, the act of communication could initiate a process 
of communication. 
When S&W talk of making intentions manifest, they seldom specify whether this 
manifestation is intentional or not. Such a neglect explains, perhaps, their claim that 
communication may be unintentional and their account of the examples which substantiate 
this disputable thesis. In my opinión, if one wishes to adopt S&W's framework, one has to 
stipulate that, in order to communicate, C must intentionally produce a stimulus which 
makes an informative intention mutually manifest, and his intention in producing the 
stimulus must be a communicative one. 
6. Ostensión and communication 
Let us turn, now, to the definition of communication by means of ostensión, and see 
whether we can get some other clue there. Ostensión is a kind of behaviour that makes 
manifest an intention to make something manifest. Since S&W do not indicate clearly 
whether such a behaviour must be intentional or not, we should distinguish between 
different possible layers of manifestness and intentionality: (1) C makes x manifest to A, 
intentionally or not; (2) C (necessarily intentionally) makes x manifest to A, and C, 
intentionally or not, makes manifest to A an intention to make x manifest to A; and so on 
ad infinitum. 
I think that S&W would say, about case (1), that C informs A of x if C has the 
corresponding intention. If C has no such intention, we have a typical instance of natural 
meaning. This result agrees with our intuitions. Let us take our example of the broken vase 
again. If A simply happens to see the pieces of the vase, then the situation means - naturally 
- that the vase is broken. As long as A does not suppose that C has arranged the pieces in 
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order to make it manifest to him that the vase is broken, he won't attribute any intention to 
C ñor consider C as informing him. But if he assumes that C has done so, he will consider 
that C has informed him. That does not mean that C has communicated, since A may 
suppose that C had no intention to make his informative intention manifest. 
About case (2), S&W would speak of ostensión and thus of communication. That means 
that C just informs A of an informative intention. But if communication is only information 
about an intention, that is a special case of information, why should one posit a 
communicative intention? Here we clearly see that S&W's two definitions of 
communication do not match. When dealing with ostensión, S&W do not mention mutual 
manifestness, while mutual manifestness is essential to their intentional definition of 
communication and the communicative intention. Assume, for the sake of the argument, 
that communication just amounts to producing a stimulus with a communicative intention, 
thus making an informative intention mutually manifest. This requirement is stronger trian 
the condition for ostensión, which only consists in making manifest to A (and not mutually 
manifest to A and C!) an informative intention. S&W themselves emphasize that 
communication has social implications that information does not have, and that such 
phenomena cannot be accounted for without some reference to mutual manifestness. 
Evenif "successful communication" requires the mutual manifestness of the informative 
intention, this does not entail, in S&W's view, that the communicative intention should be 
manifest. Contrary to what happened in Grice's model, the overtness of communication 
does not result in an infinitely regressive definition of the communicative intention. 
However, we will see in the next section that there is infinite regress in the notion of mutual 
manifestness, which should ground the difference between communication and ostensión, 
or the difference between communication and information. 
In the following, I will abandon the definition by means of ostensión. I will consider that 
S&W's notion of communication involves an informative and a communicative intention 
as defined above. 
7. Infinite regress, reflexivity and mutual manifestness 
As soon as one wishes to ensure that communication is overt, i.e. that all the intentions of 
C's involved in communication are overt, one cannot escape from assuming either an 
infinite regress of intentions or a reflexive intention which both are rather unplausible from 
a psychological viewpoint. In "Meaning" (see section' 1), Grice considered that the 
communicative intention consists in three sub-intentions, viz. (1) that A produces a response 
r, (2) that A recognizes that C has intention (1), and (3) that A fulfils (1) because of his 
satisfaction of (2). This formulation does not lead to any form of infinite regress but does 
not warrant overtness either: C can keep his intentions (2) and (3) secret; in such a case, say 
Schiffer and Strawson, we do not intuitively believe that C communicates. While accepting 
the criticism, Grice pointed out that if one adds a fourth intention, requiring that A 
recognizes (2) and (3), one is feced to a similar objection, since nothing ensures the 
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overtness of this fourth intention. Consequenüy, this way out would result in an infinite 
regress of intentions, which he found psychologically unplausible. In fact, the examples 
which could ¡Ilústrate the (non-)overtness of the fourth, fifth,... intention, though 
theoretically sound, largely exceed the cognitive power of ordinary speakers. 
Consequenüy, Grice claimed that overtness is an unreachable idealization. In practice, 
people rely on default approximations: when they do not see any element that would 
contradict optimal conditions, they conclude that these are approximately fulfilled. In the 
same perspective, Récanati's definition of the communicative intention rests on the concept 
of default reflexivity: "S's intention is default reflexive if and only if S has no intention 
inconsistent with any of the (infinite number of) intentions that his intention would entail if 
it were genuinely reflexive" (1986: 234); so the communicative intention is "an open 
(default reflexive) intention (a) that u give A reason to believe that PC12, and (b) that A 
recognize (a), and recognize it as open" (1986: 238). 
Schiffer (1972: 30-42) atterapted to solve the problem of the infinite regress of the 
communicative intentions by using the notion of mutual knowledge. Basically, when C 
communicates, C must intend to realize a state of affairs E which is mutually known by A 
and C and which provides evidence both of his intention to realize E and of his informative 
intention. Consequently, these intentions have to be mutually known for communication to 
succeed. Unfbrtunately, as shown by S&W, the very concept of mutual knowledge involves 
infinite regress and is thus psychologically unplausible. For S&W, nobody can aim at 
mutual knowledge or stick to it when communicating. Grice also accepted the psychological 
implausibility of mutual knowledge; but he immediately proposed to consider it as an 
idealization that cannot be reached in our world, so that humans, in interpretation, would 
rely on default approximations of mutual knowledge. 
To S&W, Grice's solution, which consists in considering every form of infinite regress 
as an idealization, does not seem more plausible than Schiffer's approach. In order to escape 
from infinite regress, they introduce a notion that, according to them, does not créate the 
same psychological problems: mutual manifestness. Contrary to what happens with mutual 
knowledge, mutual manifestness does not require that the individuáis effectively construct 
the representation of every assumption up to a given degree of reflexivity. Indeed, an 
assumption may be manifest without being represented. Consequently, it becomes 
psychologically plausible that some assumptions are mutually manifest. Notice, however, 
that there cannot be any definite evidence of the fact that some assumption is manifest to 
someone: S&W themselves sometimes claim that the fulfilment of the informative intention 
remains in A's hands. Consequently, mutual manifestness involves the same bets as does 
mutual knowledge: C grounds his utterance production on what he thinks is manifest to A.13 
Anyway, S&W rely on the notion of mutual manifestness to ensure the overtness of 
communication. This is, in part, the reason why I finally kept the intentional definition of 
communication rather than the definition by means of ostensión, which does not involve any 
mention of mutual manifestness. Let me repeat this definition here: C communicates iff he 
produces a stimulus intending thereby to make mutually manifest to A and to C his intention 
to make some set of assumptions {1} manifest (or more manifest) to A. Now, I would like 
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to discuss the following questions: Does mutual manifestness involve some form of infinite 
regress? Can mutual manifestness ensure the overtness of communication? What 
consequences does mutual manifestness have regarding our intuitive conception of 
communication? 
Letus firstprove, after Dominicy (1991), that S&W's definition of the communicative 
intention entails a peculiar form of infinite regress. If communication is "successful", the 
informative intention must be mutually manifest to A and C. So, it must be manifest to A 
and C (i) that C has the informative intention, (ii) that it is manifest to A and C that C has 
the informative intention, (iii) that it is manifest to A and C that it is manifest to A and C that 
C has the informative intention, and so on ad infinitum. The problem is that this infinitely 
regressive assumption is the content of the communicative intention. We have to assume, 
with Dominicy (1991), that the communicative intention represents a desirable state of 
affairs in which the informative intention is mutually manifest to A and C. It follows that the 
communicative intention should also represent the logical structure of the set of those 
assumptions that are mutually manifest to A and C. But, in such a perspective, one cannot 
see how this intention could ever be fulfilled by an action. And if one transforms the degree 
of manifestness of each assumption into a degree of intentional forcé, one just reintroduces 
an infinite regress of intentions. Thus, S&W's definition comes against the same objections 
as Grice's one, even though the intentions involved have a different content. Grice's infinite 
regress bears on the recognition of intentions while S&W's one bears on the realization of 
the communicative intention. 
When communication is "successful", Grice's definition of communication does not 
entail any mutual manifestness to A and C that C has an informative intention, but rather the 
manifestness to A of an infinite number of intentions of C's. In S&W's model, there will be 
no infinite number of intentions manifest to A, but one intention of C's will be mutually 
manifest to A and C. It is not obvious to me that S&W's constraint really ensures the 
overtness of the communicative intention. Suppose C has a deceitful intention, what 
prevents him from being considered as "communicating" in S&W's sense? Nothing, in my 
opinión, since mutual manifestness does not necessarily involve any intentionality. 
Remember, for instance, Sperber's example of "unintentional communication": you can 
transform it a little bit in order to get a case of "communication" in which C intends to 
deceive A; you only need to assume that C has a communicative intention but intends A to 
believe that he has none. If C behaves the way he does in Sperber's original example, the 
whole story looks like a perfectly plausible example of "communication" in S&W's sense. 
Still, nobody would spontaneously say that C communicates. 
On the other hand, such a conception also entails that C has the informative intention 
he makes mutually manifest. One may wonder, then, how "successful lies" could be 
accounted for in Relevance Theory. Indeed, according to Grice's or Récanati's definitions, 
and ordinary intuition, a liar will be considered as communicating in a normal way as long 
as one does not convict him of lying. In other words, C is assumed to communicate as long 
as A does not detect any intention that would conflict with C's putatively communicative 
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intention. In S&W's model, such a situation cannot happen; yet we all feel that it actually 
can. 
Finally, S&W's definition entails that C has the intention that A's understanding of C's 
communicative act is manifest to C - which is not required in Grice's definition. I personally 
think that C may be considered as communicating even though it is not manifest to him that 
A has correctly interpreted his act. The success of communication does not depend on A ñor 
on C's perception of A's reaction. It would be useless for C to aim at being able to 
reconstruct A's understanding; in some cases, it will even be impossible. Otherwise 
novelists, journalists, etc. would never communicate, since they certainly do not try to 
access to their readers' understanding and apparently do not intend to reconstruct it. In their 
rejoinder to this objection (1995: 63), S&W argüe that when journalists, professors or 
política] leaders communicate, their informative intention is presumed to be mutually 
manifest; so, as soon as they make an informative intention manifest, it becomes mutually 
manifest. In my view, this conjecture is either trivial or highly unplausible. If the mutual 
manifestness of an informative intention does not involve the mutual manifestness of the 
corresponding set of assumptions {I}, then S&W's claim simply predicts that it will be 
mutually manifest to C and A that C has an informative intention, whatever it may turn out 
to be. If, on the other hand, the mutual manifestness of an informative intention does 
involve the mutual manifestness of the corresponding set of assumptions {I}, then S&W's 
claim entails that C must have a trae knowledge of A's understanding; which is impossible. 
Of course, everybody wants to be understood but I do not believe that everybody wants to 
know for sure that which process of understanding has taken place. Moreover, such a 
dimensión would rather concern the analysis of the communicative process; and that is 
another story. 
8. Conclusión 
As the reader may guess after such a lengthy discussion, I am not fully satisfied with S&W's 
definition(s) of communication. In Jfact, S&W do not provide us with a sharp and consistent 
conception which they would maintain in their whole book. There is a lot of fuzziness or 
contradiction in and between the different definitions that they propose. Are we supposed 
to opt for one or another versión? I tried to do so. Unfortunately, no definition really 
captures what one should mean by the term "act of communication". The intentional 
perspective adopted by S&W seems both traditional and legitímate, but their 
characterization of the informative and communicative intentions rises several objections. 
S&W simply fail to describe what we intuitívely consider as an act of communication. 
Instead of solving the problem of the infinite regress of intentions, they just shift it to 
another level, so creating new difficulties. 
The notion of manifestness, as well as S&W's view of communication based on 
inference and on the modification of cognitive environments, may be useful when we come 
to analyze what really happens in communication, focusing then on the possession, 
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representation and recognition of intentions. Yet, in this perspective, I would rather rely on 
some modified versión of Récanati's definition of communication (1986: 238). The 
attractiveness of Récanati's approach is due to his acceptance of direct evidence and to his 
fine-grained treatment of manifestness, recognition and default reflexivity; this seems to me 
the only way to ensure overtness without indulging into psychological implausibility. I think 
that such a definition could be integrated in the framework of Relevance Theory, and 
consequently substitute for S&W's problematic formulations. This issue should be the topic 
of another paper. 
Notes 
* Research supported by Fonds National de la Recherche identifique (Belgium). 
1. 1 thank Maro Dominicy for his precious advice, as well as for his patient corrections of 
earlier drafts of this paper. 
2. From now on S&W. 
3. This way of conceiving action has been criticized by many authors. But its inadequacy has 
no direct bearing on my argumentation. 
4. Here I apply to the act of communication the Searlean notions of success and satisfaction, 
which are originally defined for speech acts (see e.g. Searle & Vanderveken 1985). 
5. When commenting on S&W's rejection of speech act theories, Blakemore (1991: 198) 
argües that those theories are "concerned with language as a vehicle for action rather than as a 
vehicle for thought". 
6. For a critical discussion, see e.g. Bird (1994). 
7. See e.g. Searie (1969), Récanati (1987). 
8. See Récanati (1986), Schiffer (1972). 
9. See Strawson (1971), Récanati (1986 &1987). For an alternative solution, see also 
Schiffer (1972), who relies on the notion of mutual knowledge. 
10. Contrary to my own usage (see above), S&W do not make any distinction between the 
success and the satisfaction of an act of communication. While, in S&W's sense, "success" 
seems to refer to the performance of an act of communication, their requirement rather bears on 
its satisfaction. 
11. This accounts for the fact that a sentence pronounced by a delirious person or produced 
by a computer can convey some well-determined information in the absence of any (informative 
or communicative) intention. 
12. The symbol "u" refers to the utterance and "PC" means that the prototypicality conditions 
associated with the speech act obtain. 
13. Livet (1994: 57-60) too notes that the notion of a mutual cognitive environment creates 
the same problems as mutual knowledge, since both imply múltiple extensions in some variety 
of non-monotonic logics. 
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